Outsome FS1 Participant Review | Taehoon Kim, CEO of Serverkit

Hello! Today, we’d like to share the story of Serverkit, one of the teams that completed Outsome FS1.
Among the teams that participated in the Outsome program, Serverkit was one of the teams that produced a particularly large amount of output. Because of that, we felt they would be able to most vividly share what kind of growth and learning they experienced through Outsome, and especially what they went through during the program and sessions. That’s why we asked them to share their story. We hope this post, told directly by the Serverkit team, will be helpful to founders considering applying to Outsome.

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Q. Could you introduce your company/product in one sentence?
We are building a solution that helps companies easily build the AI agents they need.

Q. If you had to describe your situation before joining FS in one sentence?
When we started Outsome FS1 (around April last year), our current product didn’t even exist yet, and we had absolutely no confidence that what we were building was actually something customers needed.

At the same time, we had a dream and hope of entering the US market.

• Before joining FS1: team size / fundraising status / B2B revenue / number of team members / location (to be quantified)

Our biggest concern was figuring out how to generate revenue.

We felt the product was somewhat ready, but we were wondering, “Can we actually sell this to customers?” and “Will this product work overseas as well?”

Q. Why hadn’t that concern been solved yet?
Through Founder Sprint, we realized that the customer we had in mind might not actually be our real customer, and that even if customers said they needed something, it might not be urgent enough for them to pay for it.

Q. Were there any assumptions you had wrong at the time?
At the time, we were building an AI tool for developers, and we thought that if it made development easier, developers would be willing to pay.
In the end, it was more like a vitamin: something nice to have, but not essential. Because it wasn’t a painkiller, it was difficult to get people to open their wallets.
But through Founder Sprint with Peter, we redefined the customer and gained a much clearer understanding of who our real customer actually was.

Because we were in software, we vaguely assumed that if we built the product and marketed it, users would naturally come in.

Q. How did you hear about FS?
I found out about it through LinkedIn. I had been following Peter’s posts because he often shared great insights, and then I happened to see a post about him running an accelerating program.

Q. What was the decisive reason you applied?
At first, more than thinking we had targeted the wrong customer, we believed that developers in Korea simply didn’t need our service yet.
So we thought, maybe people in the US would understand what we were building better and be willing to pay for it. That desire to enter the US market is what led us to apply to Outsome.
Since it was the first batch, there was some anxiety because there weren’t yet any case studies, but we trusted Peter and applied.

Q. What were you hoping to get out of the program before joining?
A lot of mentors participated—VCs and YC founders—and Peter himself had a YC / 500 Global background and had already run many accelerating programs, so we expected that we might get answers to questions and blind spots we couldn’t yet see ourselves. In reality, we received incredibly valuable feedback from many different angles, and it helped us immensely.

Q. What were the three actions you took most frequently over the four weeks?
On day one, we spent a lot of effort creating our one-liner.
From figuring out whether we could explain our product in a single sentence to preparing an elevator pitch, none of it was easy. It was hugely helpful to define the customer problem, think about whether customers viewed our product as a vitamin or a painkiller, and if it was a painkiller, learn how to charge accordingly. In a short period of time, we learned a lot from both the customer side and the investor side—how to sharpen our product narrative and how to talk to VCs when fundraising.

Q. What was the hardest assignment or mission?
The most difficult part was the pivot challenge, where we had to fully change our product. The previous product was so closely tied to me that it almost felt like an extension of myself, so it wasn’t easy to start looking at it purely as a product and from the customer’s perspective. It wasn’t that we wanted to pivot—it happened naturally because customers didn’t want what we had originally built.

Q. If you had to pick one piece of feedback from Peter that really hit hard, what would it be?
“I don’t think I would use it.” At first we focused on developers, and when that didn’t work, we tried targeting non-developers. But after hearing us out, Peter said, “I’m a non-developer too, and I don’t think I would use this.” That really snapped us back to reality.

Q. Was there a structure in the program that forced you into execution?
Rather than forced execution, I think the more motivated you are, the more you change and the more challenges you take on.

Q. Was there a moment during the program when you felt, “This is the right direction” or “This is not”?
I took Outsome together with our Head of Sales, and there were many times when we thought differently. Especially in how we approached customers: I tended to focus more on the customer’s problems and needs, while our director focused more on building rapport. Our styles were completely different—almost like an MBTI T vs. F contrast.

Q. Was there anything you felt was lacking in the direction of the program?
There were some parts that may have been true in the past but are no longer true now, though I understand that this is a difficult problem for anyone to solve. For example, in the past, going vertical with a product made sense. Before AI, you had to build a product and own your niche market. But nowadays, if you have only the idea, domain experts can often vibe-code their way into a vertical market as solopreneurs. That alone no longer feels strong enough. I think this is a challenge not just for us, but for many startup founders. It feels like the “bible” or methodology for how to deal with this new reality is only just now being written.

Q. Where did the biggest pivot or revision happen?
The core technology remained the same, but the way we presented it changed a lot. We became much more focused on how the product appears from the customer’s perspective and what they perceive as the core value. Originally, we were positioned as a no-code tool. Now, the core is our ontology-generation technology that helps customers convert complex legacy systems into AI-enabled systems.

Q. How did the way customers understood your company change before and after the program?
At first, customers saw us as a company building developer tools. Now, they see us as a company that helps customers quickly adopt and apply AI to their legacy systems so they can understand them better and improve efficiency.

Q. What were the three biggest changes after FS?
The biggest one was revenue. Most importantly, we converted to paid customers and that led to recurring revenue.Through Outsome, we came to the conclusion that we needed to meet customers. Then we started asking ourselves: “What’s the best way to meet as many customers as possible?” Rather than meeting people only online, we decided to meet customers offline and participate in an expo. At the time, we paid out of pocket to exhibit at an AI industry expo, where we had conversations with a wide variety of customers. We interviewed over 100 companies a day, and over the course of three days we spoke with around 300 companies. Through those conversations, we communicated the value our product could provide, and those conversations turned into contracts. Now we have contracts with major enterprises such as POSCO DX, Australia’s KMG, and Korea Electric Power KDM, building strong enterprise-grade references.

Q. If you had to describe the change in numbers, what changed?
Previously, all of our revenue was one-off. After completing Outsome, we converted into roughly KRW 100 million in recurring revenue. Last year, our revenue was around KRW 1 billion.

Q. What level of revenue are you expecting in 2026?
Because we believe the AI agent market will accelerate even further this year, we’re targeting around KRW 3–5 billion in revenue.

Q. If you had to share your proudest first paying customer / first PoC story, what would it be?
POSCO DX is a strong case, but I’d actually rather talk about KMG in Australia. Unlike a large company like POSCO DX—which already had strong systems and well-organized data—KMG is a Korean supermarket operator in Australia, and they didn’t have inventory management well organized, nor did they have proper visibility into sales across stores. I’m proud of that PoC story because we were able to use our product to bring structure to those problems. We’ve now moved beyond the PoC into pilot and even supply.

Q. How did you first get in touch with Australia’s KMG?
A lot of people feel that AI is still abstract, so we thought we needed to make it visible with our own eyes. That’s why we paid for a booth at the expo.
At the time, the chairman of KMG Australia was skeptical about adopting AI systems. But after experiencing our PoC, he changed his mind and concluded that it was worth adopting—leading to actual revenue. Seeing customers who had struggled with digital transformation become more operationally efficient through AI made us believe this is the direction we should continue pursuing.

Q. Can people experience the product at exhibitions?
Yes. That’s one of the differentiating strategies we pushed. While other booths simply displayed product materials, we created an experiential booth where customers could try customized demos for different contexts—manufacturing, IT, retail, and more. Customers could talk with us and build dashboards together, receiving immediate feedback on the spot.

Q. What was your fundraising situation before joining FS?
Before FS, we were basically a newborn company that hadn’t raised any investment at all. We thought our first priority was to build a track record that could support fundraising.

Q. What was the biggest bottleneck at the time?
Since we had never done IR before, there was a lot of uncertainty around whether we were doing it the right way. And there were also challenges in fundraising around AI as a theme or investment thesis.

Q. How did your one-line explanation to investors change after FS?
It became: “We convert enterprise legacy systems into AI agents.”

Q. What changed the most in your deck?
The biggest change was traction—our traction page became much larger. The technology and product explanation sections became much simpler.

Q. How did investor reactions change before and after FS?
What became clear is that after Outsome, our direction changed, and the track record that followed from that new direction gave investors much more reason to pay attention.

Q. Were there changes in pipeline metrics like meeting count, second meetings, or data requests?
Absolutely. Most importantly, my mindset changed. Before, I thought, “If we build the product well, the right people will come and use it.”
Now, I think, “Before the product, we need to talk to customers first and figure out how to provide it to them.” So instead of immediately showing customers the product, our meetings took more of a consulting shape—understanding their problem and discussing how our product could solve it. As a result, the number of meetings naturally increased, which led to many contracts.

Q. Did you personally handle the meetings as CEO?
Yes, absolutely. We do have a Head of Sales, but our basic principle was that the founder should do it directly. Peter said the same thing in Outsome as well.
I held all kinds of meetings, from coffee chats to B2B and B2C meetings. We also created opportunities in other ways—for example, by hosting our own hackathon where people we thought might be B2C users gathered and could have many conversations in a short time.

Q. What was one decisive feedback point or turning point that helped with fundraising?
In the end, “revenue is everything.” And not just revenue, but where that revenue comes from. That’s why the credibility of the enterprise customer and the nature of the customer became the biggest factor in investment decisions. Especially in AI, where many companies are just getting started, working with a credible enterprise is itself a form of proof. Or you need to go even beyond that for it to become meaningful as a track record.

Q. What was the original purpose of building the company?
From the beginning, the purpose of the company was to make all kinds of business operations easier for companies.
And if I think about the end point of that mission, it’s “full autonomy”—building a completely self-operating company.

Q. If Serverkit itself became autonomous, what would you want to do afterward?
Rather than focusing on what I personally want to do, I’d want to help employees or staff members build something in whatever business area they want to pursue.

Q. Had you participated in other programs, consulting, or mentoring before?
Yes. We had participated in various government-backed acceleration programs before. We also received many forms of consulting through early startup package programs.

Q. What was the biggest difference between those and FS?
Peter wasn’t just giving us something theoretical that you might only read in a book—he was sharing things he had personally gone out and experienced.

Q. What was uniquely strong about FS?
Peter gave founder-specific feedback grounded in reality, and that was genuinely very helpful.

Q. What was most helpful about Peter?
What I genuinely appreciated most was that Peter gave feedback from multiple perspectives—both from his experience as a co-founder and from his perspective as an investor.
Peter seems very good at reading people and analyzing their tendencies, which allows him to give highly tailored feedback. It never felt templated or formulaic—it felt like one person speaking directly to another person, saying exactly what that founder most needed to hear.

Q. How were the operations, assignments, pace, and difficulty level?
Most early-stage founders have an overwhelming amount of work to do alone, so at the time it did feel like it could be a bit overwhelming.
Still, even though I followed maybe 70–80% of it, it helped me a lot.

Q. If you could mention one or two things that could be improved?
There were many participating companies, but time was limited, so I sometimes felt speaking time should be more limited.
There were moments when conversations that could have been handled 1:1 happened in the session, and that made things feel unnecessarily long.
So one possible improvement would be to divide sections more clearly.
For example, grouping companies by topic or theme—healthcare, cosmetics, IT, etc.—could make the discussion more useful to each other and might also create some healthy invisible competition.

Q. What would you say to a founder considering FS?
If you’re hesitating, I actually think you shouldn’t be. Yes, it costs money, but more importantly, a founder’s time is far more meaningful. If you truly feel an urgent need for it, you probably won’t even hesitate. But if you’re still in a “should I or shouldn’t I?” phase, then it may still be worth spending more time hustling on your own first. And then, once you’ve reached the point where you can tell for yourself, “I’m heading in the right direction, and now I really need Outsome,” that’s when you’ll be able to get the most out of it and learn the most.

Q. What was the biggest conviction you gained thanks to FS?
I gained the conviction to stop avoiding the parts of myself and the weaknesses in our product that I didn’t want to face. There were things that were invisible to me, or things I already knew but was choosing to ignore. FS forced me to confront them directly. By doing that, I was able to focus more on customer problems, identify our product’s weaknesses and areas for improvement, fix them one by one, and sometimes pivot boldly. That gave me confidence that we were moving in the right direction.

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Q. Lastly, what would you say to yourself from four weeks earlier?
Before joining Outsome, after only hearing government-backed startup acceleration programs in Korea, I had so many worries when I was about to pay for Outsome myself.
“Will I really get enough out of this? What if I waste my money?” My advice would be:

“Please stop overthinking and just do Outsome!”

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