Outsome Founder Sprint Batch 2 (FS2) Review | Youngheon Jung, CEO of Clavie

Hello!
Today, we’d like to share the story of Clavie, a team that completed Outsome Founder Sprint Batch 2 (FS2).

Among the teams in the Outsome program, Clavie stood out as an execution-driven team that generated revenue without an MVP, pivoted its target market, and turned that into a paid PoC.

At first, they were building a B2C app for the U.S. market. But through the Outsome program, they redefined their go-to-market strategy and target customer by starting with one core question: “Who is actually willing to pay?”
As a result, they landed their first paid customer / paid PoC (around KRW 7 million), built a strong reference case, and are now expanding toward collaborations with mega creators in the science/engineering space with 1.2 million followers.

Because of that, we felt Clavie would be one of the best teams to vividly share what they learned and how they grew through the Outsome program—especially what they experienced through the sessions and structure of the program itself.

We hope this post, told directly by the Clavie FS2 team, will be helpful for anyone considering applying to Outsome in the future.

Q. Could you describe your company/product in one sentence?

We are building Clavie, an AI agent that automatically creates customized articles and card-news content from each YouTube video, helping drive viewers into a creator’s own community and convert them into members.

Q. If you had to describe your situation before joining FS in one sentence, what would it be?

I was an early-stage founder full of passion, but without clear revenue or strategy.

At the time, we were generating zero revenue, and our problem definition, customer profile, and go-to-market strategy were still not concrete. We had launched an app called Earlybird, but aside from DAU, there was no revenue.

Q. What was your biggest concern before joining?

My biggest concern was that although I had started with the U.S. market in mind, I didn’t actually know what I should do in practice.

We were building a B2C service (Earlybird.com) for Gen Z / millennials in the U.S. to help them build habits, but I had never even been to the U.S. at the time, and I had no clear sense of what actions I should take locally.

I didn’t know:

• who I should reach out to,
• how I should reach out,
• or in what order I should validate things.

We were building an app for U.S. users, but we lacked a concrete direction on what exactly to validate and how.

Looking back, I had enough passion, but I didn’t yet have a structured strategy or clear priorities for execution.

Q. Why hadn’t that concern been solved?

We launched Earlybird by benchmarking global apps like Duolingo.
But we lacked a real understanding of how to rapidly acquire users in a B2C business and convert them into paying customers.

For example, we didn’t have a clear strategy for:

• how to acquire tens of thousands of users in the early stage,
• or how to convert those users into paid customers afterward.

In particular, while our free-trial conversion rate was relatively high, we had not a single final paid conversion.

So in the end, the problem wasn’t just the product itself. It was our lack of strategy around B2C growth and monetization.

I also believe one of the key roles of a mentor is to help reduce trial and error. But at the time, I didn’t have a mentor who could concretely help me unpack these problems.

What I needed was not generic advice, but someone who had actually built a business in the U.S. market and could tell me, “This is what you should do right now.”
The biggest issue was that I hadn’t met someone who could play that role.

Q. Were there any assumptions you later realized were wrong?

Yes.

At the time, I was building a B2C app for general consumers—specifically Gen Z / millennials with ADHD—to block distracting social media, and I believed that if retention improved enough, success would naturally follow.

For example, out of around 2,000 users, about 400 were retained through week 4, and I thought that if we just kept improving retention, the business would work out.

So all my focus was on one thing:

“How do we increase retention?”

But looking back, I hadn’t thought deeply enough about the most important question:

“Who is going to pay?”

Retention matters, but it does not automatically mean the business model works.

At the time, I was deeply focused on product metrics, while my assumptions around revenue structure were relatively loose.
That was my biggest misjudgment.
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Q. So there really wasn’t a mentor around you who matched what you were looking for?

No, there wasn’t.

At the time, I didn’t have anyone around me who had actually built a business in the U.S. and truly understood the U.S. market. There are many people active in Korea, but those with real hands-on experience validating in the U.S. market are usually based there, so it was hard to have access to them.

Q. What were you hoping to get out of the program before joining?

Before joining, I wanted a real answer to the question:

“Can I actually create results that work in the U.S. market?”

I didn’t just want the experience of “going to America.”
I wanted to build a foundation for understanding:

• what needs to be validated,
• and how execution should happen,
  if I’m truly aiming at the U.S. market.

Q. What were the three actions you took the most during the four weeks?

1. Running revenue experiments without an MVP

The biggest shift was the advice:

“Try generating revenue before building the MVP.”

I had prior startup experience as a student founder, so I was used to a B2C mindset. I had very little interest in, or domain knowledge about, enterprise or B2B.

Even so, I shifted toward validating revenue potential before product completion.

I kept forming hypotheses and running experiments to create even the smallest possible structure in which real money could change hands.

2. Offline validation in person

Based on the habit-building app we were building, I formed a hypothesis around “habit management for children, targeting parents.”

So I physically went to cafés in Daechi-dong, Gangnam, and directly approached parents during the afternoon.

I politely approached parents who were mid-conversation in cafés, explained the service idea, observed reactions, and gathered feedback.

It was the first time in my life I had ever walked up to Daechi-dong parents like that. I got rejected too. But I was desperate, so I didn’t really care how awkward it was.

Through that process, I learned that:

“Ideas don’t break in your head—they break in the market.”

3. Building hypotheses → repeated testing → changing direction

Because I had shallow domain knowledge, I ended up forming and testing even more hypotheses.

For example:

• changing the target customer,
• rewriting the problem definition,
• testing pricing proposals,
• evaluating a shift from B2C to B2B.

In the middle of all the uncertainty, the thing I did most was not “thinking,” but experimenting.

Rather than searching for the perfect answer, I tried to move in a way that let me break things quickly and revise fast.

If I had to summarize it in one sentence:
It wasn’t just worrying in my head—it was repeatedly colliding with the market.

Q. What was the hardest assignment or mission?

The hardest mission was:

“Generate revenue without an MVP.”

Until then, I had been used to the sequence of:

1. complete the product first,
2. observe user reactions,
3. then think about monetization.

So being asked to generate revenue before the product was complete—before even having a real MVP—completely shook my way of thinking.

It was especially difficult because I could no longer hide behind the excuse of:

“We’re not ready yet.”

But at the same time, that challenge also created the most growth for me.

Q. If you had to pick one piece of feedback from Peter that really hit hard, what would it be?

I think it was around week 3.

He said something like:

“Even making KRW 1 million would be a huge challenge for this team. Did I misjudge you?”

That hit me the hardest.

I wouldn’t say I was hurt by it. It created a sense of urgency.

My first reaction was:

“I can’t disappoint him.”

And after that, I think I started taking action much more intensely.

Looking back, that feedback wasn’t just provocative. It was very precisely aimed at my personality.

He seemed to understand that I’m not someone who shrinks under pressure—I’m someone who moves harder to prove myself.

After hearing that, my attitude shifted strongly toward:

“I’ll show it through results.”

My execution intensity and speed changed completely after that.
It was a very important sentence for me.

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Q. Was there some kind of structure in the program that almost forced execution?

Yes, there were two main things.

The first was the very clearly limited 4-week timeframe.

There was a real sense of pressure that I had to produce results within that window. And those results weren’t abstract “learning”—they meant actual revenue.

Of course, some people create outcomes even after the program ends. But at that time, I strongly felt that:

“I have to prove it within these 4 weeks.”

That limited timeframe itself pushed execution.

The second was the framework.

It wasn’t just “go make revenue.”
We were given a structured execution framework built from Peter’s experience in Korea and the U.S., as well as his investment and YC-related experience.

For example:

• how to define ICP using the BANT framework
• what traction and vision a B2C startup like ours absolutely must highlight in an IR deck
• the 5 must-ask questions in user interviews

Because the structure for how to define the target, design monetization experiments, and decide what to do in what order was already laid out, I could focus purely on execution within that structure.

To be honest, “digesting” the framework wasn’t easy.
The execution intensity was high.

But thanks to that structure, I didn’t wander—I could pour my energy in one direction.

In the end, I think these three things combined to create an environment where avoiding execution was almost impossible:

• limited time,
• a clear revenue goal,
• and a structured execution framework.

Q. Was there a specific moment when you felt, “This direction is right” or “This is wrong”?

Yes.

It was the moment when actual revenue came in by executing the way Peter suggested.

Especially because revenue came in before we had fully built the MVP, that moment was decisive. That was when I became convinced that:

“This direction is right.”

Inside the team, some people still thought we should first finish building the app.
But I believed that one of the biggest reasons startups fail is simply lack of revenue.

No matter how good the vision or the team is, if revenue doesn’t happen, it’s hard to survive long.

Through this experience, I realized that in the early stage, a B2B approach can be structurally more favorable than B2C.

B2C felt more like “hunting” in a highly uncertain field, while B2B felt more like “farming”—if you create structure and execute, results can follow.

The moment actual revenue happened, I became confident that this was not just a theory, but an executable strategy.

Q. Where did the biggest pivot or revision happen?

The biggest pivot was the target customer shift.

Initially, when I went to the U.S., I went very deep into solving problems directly for people with ADHD. That problem clearly still exists, and there are many people suffering from it.

But as I studied the market more closely, I realized something:

Creators who had already been building content around ADHD were continuously benefiting from that market.

At that moment, I started asking myself:

“In this market, who is digging for gold, and who is selling the pickaxes?”

There’s that classic story from the U.S. gold rush: the people who made the biggest money weren’t always the gold miners—they were often the ones selling jeans and pickaxes.

So I started thinking:
What is the ‘pickaxe’ in the ADHD market?

That led us to pivot toward collaborating with creators who were already producing ADHD-related content, and running a PoC with them.

In other words, instead of directly targeting end consumers, we shifted toward targeting the players who already served them.

What I learned from this was that a pivot doesn’t always require moving to a completely different market. Sometimes, based on the product understanding and domain knowledge you’ve already built, simply moving one step sideways within the same space can reveal a new answer.

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Q. How did the way customers understand your company change before and after Outsome?

Now we’re no longer a company that just explains—we’re a company that proves with revenue.

Before joining, we could explain what we did, but we couldn’t fully build trust around how it connected to real business outcomes.

We had ideas and direction, but no proven numbers.

After the program, once we had generated actual revenue, the way customers perceived us changed completely.

Especially from the point of view of creators—our main customers—the positioning became much clearer:

“This is a team that can actually generate revenue within the creator economy.”

I think there is no stronger proof of a team or company than revenue.

Especially in a market like today, overflowing with AI services, the ability to generate real revenue is a much stronger trust signal than just having a good idea.

So before the program, we were a team that talked about potential.
After the program, we became a team that had proven results.

Q. Do you have a first paid customer / first paid PoC story you’re especially proud of?

Yes.

The most meaningful one was running a PoC with a micro creator during the Outsome Sprint and generating actual revenue through that.

Once we built that first reference case, it became possible to connect with a mega creator with over 1 million subscribers, and based on that reference, we were able to move all the way into contract discussions.

Q. Can you reveal the name of the mega creator?

Yes — Geekble.

This collaboration began through an introduction from an existing network. We met in Korea and discussed things directly, focusing on the structural problems and needs the creator was actually facing.

In particular, as we discussed the many operational and business issues that come up during content creation, the partnership evolved in a direction where we could help solve them.

Q. How did you first get to know Peter?

I first found him through LinkedIn.

One day, I came across a post he wrote—“3 Ways to Make Customers Pay You No Matter What”—and from then on, I naturally followed him and kept reading his writing.

Around last April, I saw a post saying something like:

“If you’re interested in a small accelerating program I’m launching, reach out.”

At the time, I hesitated. I didn’t feel prepared enough yet, and I didn’t want to approach it out of vague curiosity.

Then around June, he posted a similar message again:

“If you’re interested in the U.S. market, reach out.”

And for some reason, this time I felt:

“If not now, maybe never.”

So I stopped hesitating, carefully organized my situation and concerns, and sent him a thoughtful message.

That’s how the connection started.

Q. What did the message you sent Peter say?

Honestly, at that time I didn’t really know much about Outsome as a program itself. I was just desperate to get some kind of clue about the U.S. market.

In the message, I honestly explained:

• what kind of service I was building,
• that I was targeting the U.S. market,
• and what exactly was blocking me.

The spirit of the message was basically:

“I want advice on what I should be paying attention to if I’m going to keep pursuing this business in the U.S. market.”

My main intention wasn’t necessarily to apply to the program, but rather to get a reality check on direction.

After the Zoom call with Peter, I received assignments tailored specifically to me.

At the time, I was scheduled to fly to San Francisco the following week.

Since we were building an app for U.S. users, my teammates and I had already booked flights because we thought we should go experience the market directly on the ground.

But at that point, our plan was still very macro-level:

• meet investors,
• try to acquire U.S. users.

Looking back, we had direction, but not enough concrete execution strategy.

After the Zoom call, Peter gave us the following assignment:

• Clarify exactly what we would do during our 10-day U.S. trip
• Define KPIs clearly and design what we would validate during those 10 days
• Share the plan again once structured

For the next 3–4 days after the call, I focused almost entirely on KPI design and refining the schedule.

The mission we received was:

1. While in the U.S., make at least one real Stanford student friend
2. Conduct mom-style interviews with up to 10 ADHD college students on campus
3. Do not pitch even once — instead, document their lifestyle habits and list the tools they already use to manage their ADHD

Instead of treating it as a simple visit, we rebuilt the trip around one central question:

“What exactly are we validating within these ten days?”

Q. What was the decisive reason you ended up joining Outsome?

Right before my departure to the U.S., I happened to have a schedule near where Peter was. Even though it was a weekend, I went to meet him in person.

There, I got much more concrete and detailed advice on what actions I should take in the U.S.

It wasn’t just broad direction—it became a clear action plan for what I needed to do right now.

I also shared why I was doing this in the first place and what kind of vision I had. Through that process, I became confident that our direction aligned.

That’s when I naturally decided to join Outsome.

Above all, there were two decisive reasons:

1. I truly wanted to build a real business targeting the U.S. market
2. More than anything, I was desperate to generate revenue

I didn’t want to prove an idea.
I wanted to prove actual revenue.

That desperation was probably the biggest reason I joined Outsome.

Looking back, it wasn’t just that I was introduced to a program. It was more like a sequence of:

• pitching
• receiving sharp feedback
• execution assignments
• KPI design
• a U.S. visit structured for real validation
• an in-person meeting that aligned direction

That whole process made the decision feel natural.

I heard about Outsome through an introduction, but I think the real decision happened through the process of execution and validation.

Q. Why did you choose entrepreneurship?

I chose entrepreneurship because of two career principles I set for myself in the second half of the year before last:

1. Do I feel that I am making the world better?
2. Can I have full ownership over the work?

Based on those criteria, I thought there were realistically two main options:

• start a company,
• or take on a highly ownership-driven role like PM/PO in a startup.

Among those, I ultimately chose to start a company.

I also felt that the creator market is a space where entering now matters—this is the window in which you can capture meaningful opportunities and potentially shape long-term standards.

And I thought that, while still young, going to the U.S. and learning by direct collision would also be advantageous from an adaptation standpoint.

Q. Why the U.S.?

It wasn’t just because the U.S. is a large market.

I believed the U.S. is where global standards are created.

In many emerging industries, the place where the standard gets defined first is often the U.S. market. Companies out of Silicon Valley—Google, Uber, Meta, etc.—create the product and market standards in the U.S., and then those standards spread globally.

Ultimately, I want to build a product used by people all over the world. And if that’s the goal, I believed the starting point had to be the U.S.

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Q. What value does Clavie provide?

Many creators, including YouTubers, are dependent on platforms.

If platform algorithms or policies change, their views and income can swing dramatically overnight. Yet creators often struggle to directly access detailed data about their own subscribers. In other words, because content creation has become their livelihood, they are forced to absorb platform risk themselves.

We help creators move beyond the platform and build independent community infrastructure where they can own and use their own audience data directly.

This includes:

• building their own community site
• designing a CRM structure based on subscriber behavior data
• designing monetization models inside the community, such as group purchases, education, memberships, etc.
• validating the possibility of expanding into a marketplace based on activity data

In short, we help creators move from being farmers working on someone else’s land to becoming landowners of their own property.

Q. Had you previously participated in other programs, consulting, or mentoring?

Yes.

Q. What was the biggest difference compared with FS?

The biggest difference was that it was structured coaching clearly aimed at the U.S. market.

It didn’t just cover general startup advice. It specifically helped design how to generate actual revenue in the U.S. market.

Most importantly, Peter’s 1:1 coaching gave us feedback that was highly optimized for our exact situation.

It wasn’t generic advice.
It was about identifying:

“What action does our team need right now?”

Q. What was FS especially strong at?

The strongest part was that Peter’s experience came through in a highly compressed, practical form.

His:

• real company-building experience
• YC-related experience
• investor perspective

were not delivered separately—they were integrated into a single framework and passed on to us.

Because the feedback reflected the perspective of a founder, an accelerator, and an investor at the same time, it wasn’t just:

“Try this.”

It also explained:

“This is why you should do it this way.”

And the fact that this became customized coaching was, in my view, Outsome’s greatest strength.

The biggest difference was that we were no longer moving on gut feeling alone—we were executing on top of a framework condensed from real experience.

Q. What are the three biggest things you get out of Outsome?

1. How to generate revenue without an MVP
2. A framework for signing B2B enterprise PoC contracts
3. A fundraising roadmap for a pre-seed startup

Q. What would you say to a founder who is considering Outsome?

If you still aren’t sure whether your direction is right, and you feel like you’re repeating trial and error, I would say it’s worth at least meeting once.

Especially if you’re thinking about the U.S. market, or you have a strong will to survive no matter what, Outsome can be a very good option.

At the very least, I think you’ll definitely gain a new angle from which to look at your problem.

Q. What advice would you give your pre-Outsome self?

“Start by getting paid first!”

Before building the perfect product or creating a fully finished environment, I should have designed a structure where money could actually move.

Everything started with payment.

The moment revenue happened, the direction of my thinking and the priority of my execution changed completely.

Q. What is the biggest confidence or conviction you gained thanks to Outsome?

I chose a path with huge uncertainty, but at least now I feel confident that I won’t starve.

Startups are nerve-wracking every day. But through this experience, I gained confidence that if I use the methods and structures I learned, I can create leverage.

Above all, the biggest thing was realizing that I can reduce trial and error.

In entrepreneurship, time is an unavoidable cost. No matter how talented you are, you’ll make many mistakes if you do it alone. But if someone more experienced in the industry helps adjust your direction, you can significantly reduce that time.

You can’t reduce it to zero.
But you absolutely can shorten it.

Q. Lastly, if you had to summarize the single biggest sentence that changed most when comparing before and after Outsome, what would it be?

“I’m still an imperfect founder, but now I’ve evolved one step further into an operator who knows how to generate revenue.”

Before Outsome, I had ideas and passion, but I was still stuck in vague anxiety and repeated trial and error.

There were many possible directions, but little conviction.
I was taking action, but without a clear structure.

Now, I still wouldn’t say I’m perfect. But at the very least, I’ve become someone who has actually generated revenue and experienced market validation firsthand.

That difference is bigger than it sounds.

The biggest change is that I’m no longer just someone who talks about dreams—
I’ve become someone who has proven something with numbers.

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